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VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 31 MARCH 1978 NUMBER 2
Horizontal Divestiture in the
Petroleum Industryt
Jesse W. Markham* and Anthony Hourihan**
"Divestiture" as applied to the oil industry has now clearly
come to mean different things to different people, and often differ-
ent things to the same people. On the one hand it has taken on all
the attributes of a political slogan, very much like the "free silver"
battle cry of the 1890's. It inspired the introduction of over twenty
bills in the Ninety-Fifth Congress and served as a plank in the
Democratic Party's platform of 1976, providing the one rallying
point for the dozen or so candidates who sought the party's presi-
dential nomination. In fact, during the autumn of 1976 political
television advertisements proclaiming some candidates' support of
oil company divestiture rained upon the viewing public with all the
aesthetic elegance we associate with toothpaste and deodorant com-
mercials-reaching a rather confusing high point with candidate
Fred Harris's vow to break up the eighteen "oil monopolies."
Substantial evidence indicates, then, that those who urge hori-
zontal divestiture in the oil industry champion a popular cause. As
will be documented in some detail below, this popularity does not
rest upon any reasonable expectation that the public might reap
measurable economic benefits in the form of improved efficiency in
either the "Pareto optimum"' or "Schumpetarian" 2 sense. On the
contrary, the data strongly suggests that horizontal divesture, as
* Charles Edward Wilson Professor of Business Administration, Harvard Business
School. B.A., University of Richmond, 1941; M.A., 1947, Ph.D., 1949, Harvard University.
** Doctoral Candidate, Harvard Business School. B.A., University College, Dublin,
1969; M.B.A., University of Wisconsin, 1971.
t Portions of this paper draw heavily upon data contained in the authors' larger study;
J. MARKHAM, A. HOURIHAN & F. STERLING, HORIZONTAL DIVESTrnE AND THE PETROLEUM
INDUSTRY (1977) [hereinafter cited as MARKHAM]. The research time donated to this paper
was supported by a grant from the General Electric Foundation.
1. A discussion of the whole family of propositions associated with Pareto optimality is
contained in Boulding, Welfare Economics and Samuelson, Comment, in 2 A SURWEY OF
CONTEMPORARY ECONOMICS 1-34, 36-38 (B.F. Haley ed. 1952).
2. J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 188-90 (2d ed. 1946).
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contemplated in the Interfuel Competition Act (S.489),' would in-
flict economic costs for which society would receive no off-setting
economic benefits. Nevertheless, in the economic climate that has
prevailed since the Middle East's "October War" of 1973-the five-
fold oil price increase by OPEC, rising gasoline and fuel oil prices,
the severe winter of 1976-77, and its attendant natural gas shor-
tage-the need for decisive action has become a matter of political
urgency. Political leaders cannot, with credibility, promise their
constituents dissolution of OPEC, temperate winters, or removal of
the constraints of nature. They can offer, however, to break up the
larger oil companies. Since motorists and home owners vastly out-
number large oil companies, this may, as Morris Adelman has
pointed out,4 make a lot of people feel better, thereby creating a
public good of unspecified but substantial magnitude.
In this Article, we plan to analyze the divestiture issue in more
conventional, industrial-organization terms.' It is generally agreed
that divestiture is an appropriate antitrust remedy for excessive
market power when such power gives its possessor a means of ex-
cluding competition and controlling price. Stated in the language
of industrial organization, the purpose of divestiture is to break up
the interfirm modus operandi, described variously as oligopolistic
rationalization, conjectural interdependence, conscious parallelism,
or tacit collusive behavior, that is commonly associated with highly
concentrated industries containing a small number of competitively
forebearing rivals.'
Although no one familiar with the vast body of literature on
market concentration would contend that a test has emerged for
establishing the threshold point at which the concentration level
leads to tacit collusion, there is substantial agreement that four-
firm concentration ratios exceeding fifty percent, especially those
equal to or greater than seventy percent, are of legitimate public
policy concern.
Joe Bain, for example, has stated that in markets within the
highest concentration category, where more than seventy-five per-
cent of industry output is supplied by the largest four sellers, firms
would have a "maximum tendency to agree on a joint profit-
maximizing price, and a minimum propensity to pursue indepen-
3. S.489, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
4. AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, HoRIZoNTALI DIVESTITURE 22 (W. S. Moore ed. 1977).
5. MARKHAM, supra at t.
6. J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 135-36 (2d ed. 1968).
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dent and antagonistic policies." 7 In industries in which the largest
four sellers supply from fifty-one percent to seventy-five percent of
industry output, Bain is of the opinion that "joint monopoly tenden-
cies still appear probable," but that there is "an enhanced likeli-
hood that these tendencies may be tempered or restrained by the
independent antagonistic policies of individual sellers." When the
largest four firms supply from twenty-six to fifty percent of industry
output (a category into which most sectors of the petroleum indus-
try fall under the generally used market definition), Bain concludes
that the mutually recognized interdependence of sellers still may be
"strong enough that strictly independent action is counter-balanced
by some tendency toward concerted action for maximum joint prof-
its."9 Furthermore, Bain points out that there is "a legitimate ques-
tion as to whether we still have oligopoly" in industries in which the
four-firm concentration ratio is thirty-five to fifty percent, the larg-
est eight firms have forty-five to seventy percent of the market, and
the industry as a whole contains a large number of sellers. One can,
therefore, summarize Bain's conclusions regarding concentration
and the likelihood of tacit cooperation as follows:
TABLE I
Sales of Largest Four Firms Likelihood of
as Percentage Share of Market Tacit Cooperation
76 - 100 High
51 - 75 Moderate
26-50 Low
0-25 Very Low
Other seasoned.students of antitrust theory have proposed
more stringent criteria. In their now neoclassical study of the mo-
nopoly problem, Carl Kaysen and Donald Turner argued that:
"Market power shall be conclusively presumed where, for five years
or more, one company has accounted for fifty percent or more of
annual sales in the market, or four or fewer companies have ac-
counted for eighty percent of sales."'" Similarly, in 1967 the White
House Task Force on Antitrust Policy defined an "oligopoly indus-
try" as one in which:
7. Id.
8. Id. at 136.
9. Id.
10. C. KAYSEN & D. TuRNER, ANInTRUnST PoLIc: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYsis 98
(1959).
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(i) any four or fewer firms had an aggregate market share of seventy percent
or more during at least seven of the ten and four of the most recent five base
years; and
(ii) the average market share during the five most recent years of the four
firms with the largest average market shares during those base years amounted
to at least eighty percent of those same four firms during the five preceding
base years."
Finally, the proposed Industrial Reorganization Act'2 reserved a pre-
sumption of monopoly power for industries with a four-firm concen-
tration ratio of at least fifty percent. We conclude, therefore, that
economists and antritrust law scholars generally agree that a four-
firm concentration ratio of fifty percent is the cut-off point below
which significant market power cannot reasonably be inferred.
When the structure of the oil industry is assessed against these
standards, the economic case for wholesale divestiture of the major
oil companies becomes exceedingly elusive, and the case for requir-
ing petroleum companies to divest themselves of nonoil energy as-
sets is completely unintelligible. In any ranking of industry concen-
tration ratios, the petroleum industry falls well within the bottom
half of the list, substantially below the approximately forty percent
average for all manufacturing. 3 According to the Federal Trade
Commission Report on its investigation of the petroleum industry,
the United States had 129 crude oil refining companies in 1972.'" As
of 1976 the largest four of these companies accounted for 32.7 per-
cent of total refinery runs, the largest eight for 56.7 percent, and the
largest twenty for 84.4 percent.' 5 The level of concentration is
slightly lower when calculated on the basis of installed refinery ca-
pacity.
Calculated concentration ratios for crude oil production and
crude oil reserves are not entirely unambiguous statistics. Typically,
the lease arrangement between a landowner and a producer provides
that the owner holds title to a certain percentage of the oil produced
from wells on his property. For many years these leases required the
producer to find a market for the owner's share of the oil, an obliga-
tion the producer customarily fulfilled by buying the owner's oil at
11. REPORT OF THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON ANTITRUST POLICY, A-8 (The Neal
Report, 1969), reprinted in 1 J. REPRINTS ANTITRUST L. & EcoN. 720 (1969).
12. Industrial Reorganization Act, S.3832, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
13. F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 63 (1970).
14. FEDERAL TRADE COmm'N STAFF REPORT TO THE SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSU-
LAR AFFAIRS, 93D CONG., 1ST SESS., PRELIMINARY REPORT ON ITS INVESTIGATION OF THE PETRO-
LEUM INDUSTRY 18 (Comm. Print 1973).
15. U.S. Petroleum Market Volumes and Market Shares: 1950-1976 (API Discussion
Paper No. 003R, Sept. 1977).
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the prevailing posted price. Because of this practice, the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) has sometimes included the landowner's
share in the producer's production. On the other hand, the Ameri-
can Petroleum Institute (API), guided by the fact that landowners
hold legal title to their share of the oil and can exercise the right of
independent ownership, does not include landowners' shares in
producers' output for purposes of calculated market shares.'" In re-
cent years landowners, especially public landowners, have often
exercised their ownership rights. For example, the city of Long
Beach, California, owns several oil fields and exercises ownership
over a large portion of the oil produced from them under contracts
between the city and more than six different oil companies. Since
the landowner's share historically has ranged from one-sixth to one-
fifth, concentration ratios calculated by the API tend to average
from four-fifths to five-sixths of those calculated by the FTC
method. (See Table II).
TABLE I
CONCENTRATION IN CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION, 1969
API Method FTC Method
Largest 4 25.5% 31%
Largest 8 41.2% 51%
Largest 20 60.8% 70%
Irrespective of the method used, however, the level of concen-
tration in crude oil production in the United States is considerably
lower than the average for all United States industry. (See Table
III).
TABLE I
CONCENTRATION IN CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION AND RESERVES, 1976
Reserves**
Production* Privately Owned Total
Largest 4 25.5 35.1 27.3
Largest 8 40.5 54.2 42.2
Largest 20 61.0 73.1 56.9
*API Basis
**1975
Source: J. MARKHAM, A. HOURIHAN & F. STERLING, HORIZONTAL DIVESTITURE AND THE PETRO-
LEUM INDUSTRY 12 (1977); U.S. Petroleum Market Volumes and Market Shares:
1950-1976 (API Discussion Paper No. 003R, Sept. 1977).
16. The difference in the calculated concentration ratio under the two methods may be
illustrated as follows: In 1974 total domestic petroleum liquid production amounted to 14,440
MB/D, of which the largest four producers, in terms of the oil to which they held legal title
at point of production, accounted for 2,720 MB/D, or 25%. However, according to Federal
Trade Commission estimates, these four companies purchased landowners' oil at the well-
head amounting to an additional 580 MB/D, which, if added to their own share of the oil
produced, would give them a total market share of nearly 31%.
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If the landowners' share is excluded from producers' production, the
largest four oil companies accounted for 25.5 percent of total domes-
tic crude production in 1976. If the landowners' share is included,
the largest four accounted for approximately thirty percent. Both of
these concentration ratios, however, vastly overstate the share of the
United States market in the hands of the top four domestic produ-
cers. In 1976, imports representing crude oil production no longer in
the hands of the large international oil companies accounted for
forty percent of total United States consumption. Hence, the true
concentration ratio falls somewhere in the range of fifteen percent
to nineteen percent.
These levels of concentration generally have been considered to
establish a prima facie case that the industries involved are compet-
itively structured; in fact, they conform reasonably well to the end
results once contemplated in the proposed Industrial Reorganiza-
tion Act. 7 Hence, for this reason, we may conclude that the case for
breaking up the large oil companies horizontally is extraordinarily
weak. Having reached this conclusion, however, one would have to
concede that the only primary social costs of such dissolutions
would be the sacrifice of certain long-established antitrust princi-
ples. Dividing the two largest present oil companies into, say, two
Texacos and three Exxons may make the population happier with-
out doing irreparable damage to the basic efficiency of the oil indus-
try.
When it comes to the kind of horizontal divestiture contem-
plated in the Interfuel Competition Act, however, the prospective
social costs are much larger than the mere abandonment of current
antitrust doctrine. Since that act rests on the premise that there is
a significant quantity of actual or potential competition among
fuels, the measurement of concentration levels under alternative
market definitions becomes relevant. (See Table IV).
17. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
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TABLE IV
CONCENTRATION RArIos USING SELECTED DEFINITIONS OF THE ENERGY INDUSTRY
BASED ON PRODUCTION IN BTU EQUIVALENTS, 1 9 7 4 a
ENERGY INDUSTRY DEFINITION
Oil
Oil & Gas
Oil & Gas & Coal
Concentration Oil & Gas & Coal & Uranium
Ratios b Oil C & Gas & Coal & Uraniumd & Geothermal
4-Firm 26.0% 25.1% 19.1% 18.4% 18.4%
8-Firm 41.7 39.2 31.5 29.7 29.'1
20-Firm 61.4 59.0 49.6 47.8 47
a BTU Heat Equivalent Weights: oil: 5,620,900 BTUs/bbl; natural gas: 1,102,000 BTUs/000
ft'; coal: 24,580,000 BTUs/short ton; uranium (U, 0,): 430 billion BTUs/short ton; geother-
mal: 3,412 BTUs/kilowatt hour (FTC, CONCENTRATION LEVELs AND TRENDS IN TIE ENERGY
SECTOR OF THE U.S. ECONOMY 452 (1974)).
b Sources: Calculated from raw data from: FTC, CONCENTRATION LEVELS AND TRENDS IN
ENERGY SECTOR OF THE U.S. ECONOMY (1974); corporate annual reports, various issues. U.S.
Coal Production by Company-1974, in KEYSTONE COAL INDUSTRY MANUAL: (1975); House
Committee in Mines and Mining (unpublished data).
c Net crude oil, condensate, and natural gas liquids.
d Uranium concentrate (yellow cake).
Table reprinted from MARKHAM, supra, at 11.
As one would logically expect, when the relevant market definition
is enlarged from oil to include, successively, gas, coal, uranium, and
geothermal deposits, concentration at the four-,eight-, and twenty-
firm levels declines. Even with no adjustment for imports, the larg-
est four firms account for only 18.4 percent of the total energy mar-
ket, and the largest eight for only 29.7 percent.
Application of conventional principles of industrial organiza-
tion to the uncontested facts concerning the oil and other energy
industries leads to the fairly obvious conclusion that the appropriate
remedy for improving the performance of energy companies does not
lie in a wholesale restructuring of the industry. On this conclusion
(the pending Federal Trade Commission case against the eight larg-
est oil companies notwithstanding) 8 even the two antitrust agencies
apparently agree. The FTC's 1974 report, Concentration Levels and
Trends in the Energy Sector of the U.S. Economy, stated: "[t]his
study does not provide any positive support to the proposal that
petroleum companies be banned from acquiring coal or uranium
18. In re Exxon Corp., No. 8934 (FTC, filed July 18, 1973). The complaint in this case
appears to be more concerned with vertical than horizontal integration.
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companies; nor . . . from acquiring coal or uranium reserves."' 9
Frederic M. Scherer, then chief economist of the Federal Trade
Commission, reaffirmed this conclusion in his statement before the
Joint Economic Committee, 0 and Thomas E. Kauper, Assistant
Attorney General for Antitrust, stated before the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary in 1976:
The petroleum industry appears to be one of the least concentrated of our
nation's major industries. This data calls into question the propriety of mas-
sive structural reorganization. If the present structure does not exhibit the
characteristics associated with excessive market power then a solution based
on that premise may be both unavailable and counterproductive. 2'
We place considerable weight on these conclusions for reasons
other than their entire consistency with our own. Energy companies,
especially large oil companies, are scarcely viewed by the public
with deep and abiding affection. Given the political emotion at-
tached to the oil company divestiture issue, the most innocent of
scholars who conclude that horizontal integration in energy is not
anticompetitive easily may be accused by some of the Faustian sin
of having sold their souls to Mephistopheles. We can live comforta-
bly with the assumption that the two antitrust agencies have not yet
been taken over by apologists for monopoly and that the leadership
of neither organization has fallen into the hands of those having a
special affection for large oil companies. Moreover, even those who
support the Interfuel Competition Act have publicly acknowledged
that their case for divestiture confronts the bothersome fact of low
concentration. The late Senator Philip Hart observed in his speech
at the Airlie House Conference on Concentration that by most stan-
dards the oil industry was not highly concentrated. 2 Dr. Walter
Measday, staff economist for the Senate committee considering the
legislation, has stated that "available statistics provide a surface
appearance of moderate concentration . . . far less . . .than...
in a number of other industries, ranging from automobiles and com-
puters to men's underwear and paper napkins. '23
19. FTC, CONCENTRATION LEVELS AND TRENDS IN THE ENERGY SECTOR OF THE U.S.
ECONOMY 260-61 (1974).
20. Horitontal Integration of the Energy Industry: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Energy of the Joint Economic Comm., 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 75 (1975).
21. The Petroleum Industry: Hearings on S.2387 Before the Senate Judiciary
Committee, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1976).
22. See the conference proceedings in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING
(H. Goldschmid, H.J. Mann, & J.F. Weston eds. 1974). The reference is to Senator Hart's
unpublished address to the conference's plenary session.
23. Measday, Feasibility of Petroleum Industry Divestiture, in RESEARCH AND DEVELOP-
MENT IN ENERGY 178 (D. J. Teese ed. 1977).
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Since virtually everybody agrees that the case for horizontal
divestiture on purely economic grounds is exceedingly weak, a re-
turn to the observation on which this Article opened is appropriate.
Would the social good embodied in the apparent happiness horizon-
tal divestiture would bring to many people entail substantial social
costs? Although reducing this social benefit-social cost analysis to
quantitative terms clearly is difficult, the evidence strongly suggests
that the price of happiness would run high.
First, one must recognize that the proposed legislation would
require the oil companies not only to divest themselves of their
nonoil energy operations and reserves, but also to refrain from enter-
ing anew these energy industries in the future. Economists univer-
sally recognize that freedom of entry into an industry is a vital
aspect of competition.24 Since the Interfuel Competition Act would
eliminate petroleum companies as both potential and actual en-
trants into other sectors of the energy industry, it would protect
nonoil energy companies from the kind of competition that the anti-
trust laws historically have fostered.2 This anticompetitive feature
of the bill takes on added significance when one further considers
that petroleum companies, with their expertise in managing
capital-intensive, long-lead-time, high-technology, natural-resource
projects, are logical candidates for entry into other sectors of the
energy industry.
Second, by investing in other energy sources and in research
and development (R&D), the oil companies, in response to conven-
tional market incentives, are doing precisely what our national en-
ergy policy calls for. Since 1975 federally-funded R&D in energy has
moved gradually up the scale of national priorities until by fiscal
year 1978 it ranked second only to R&D outlays for defense.', In
recent years the R&D effort of oil companies also has increased and
has shifted from an exclusive concern with oil and gas to the devel-
opment of alternative energy sources. For example, in 1971, 90.2
percent of the industry's investment in R&D efforts was expended
in the area of oil and gas. By 1975 this proportion had dropped to
76.2 percent. In the same five year period, R&D investment by
petroleum companies in coal and shale took a giant leap upward,
24. J. BAIN, Conditions of Entry and the Emergence of Monopoly, in ESSAYS ON PRICE
THEORY AND INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 74-94 (1972); J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEw COMPEIrmON
205-20 (1956); SCHERER, supra note 13, at 376-77.
25. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580-81 (1967); United States v. El Paso
Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
26. NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, SCIENCE REsouRcEs STUDIEs HIGHLIGHTS 3 (NSF77-
323, October 1977).
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from a bare 3.3 percent of total R&D expenditures to nearly sixteen
percent." The data also show that in the petroleum industry there
is at least a weak positive relationship between firm size and R&D
intensity; the eight largest companies account for a dispropor-
tionately large share of the industry's total R&D.
This pattern of R&D expenditures by major oil companies is
consistent with the aims of national policy on energy research. Most
of the recent large increase in the budget of the Energy Research and
Development Authority has been directed toward the development
of nonoil energy sources, the same area in which petroleum compa-
nies are increasing their R&D outlays. Were the oil companies pre-
cluded from investing in the development of alternate energy re-
sources, it is highly doubtful that other firms in the private sector
would take over the large R&D establishments found in the petro-
leum industry or create new ones of comparable magnitude to take
their place. Furthermore, the significant synergistic effects and
technology transfers that are attributable to the petroleum compa-
nies' participation in R&D in alternate energy resources would be
lost if these companies were to undergo horizontal divestiture.
Finally, horizontal divestiture would reduce significantly the
degree of asymmetry among energy companies, eliminate the poten-
tial for development of even greater asymmetry among these firms,
and thereby reduce substantially the degree of interfirm competi-
tion. Asymmetry- dissimilarity among competing firms' assets,
organizational structures, product lines, business strategies and
objectives-is a potentially important element in the evolution of
"workable competition" within an industry."' Horizontal diversifi-
cation by petroleum companies clearly will lead to an even greater
degree of asymmetry and, therefore, will make them more likely to
compete with each other. Hence, even if one were disposed to argue
ex hypothesi that the eight, twelve, or eighteen "pure" petroleum
companies, in spite of the relatively low concentration at this level,
might pursue a common course of action in respect to oil, one must
concede the unlikelihood that the same number of firms would per-
ceive as profitable such a concerted course of action once they had
attained a considerable degree of asymmetry through interfuel div-
ersification. In time, the varying percentages of their assets relating
to oil, gas, geothermal deposits, shale, uranium, and the like would
greatly reduce the possibility of a common course of action equally
27. These figures were obtained through a survey of the 23 major oil companies.
MARKHAM, supra at t, at 88.
28. Id. at 90-91.
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suited to them all. Therefore, a legislative environment that fosters
horizontal diversification by energy producers appears far more
likely to maintain workable competition in the energy industry than
one that forces each energy-producing firm to specialize in a single
fuel. The degree of asymmetry in the energy industry will be in-
creased substantially if oil companies are allowed to continue on
their present diverse paths of horizontal diversification. Some com-
panies have acquired or developed coal resources while shunning oil
shale and geothermal deposits; some have developed geothermal
and oil shale deposits, but have stayed almost entirely out of ura-
nium and coal; and others have remained relatively undiversified,
confining their activities to their traditional energy industry. The
pattern effected through horizontal diversification, however, is one
of increasing asymmetry among the major petroleum companies.
Legislation that would greatly reduce this important means for in-
creased competition might achieve results diametrically opposed to
its stated objectives.
Abbot Payson Usher, the distinguished Harvard economic his-
torian, often used major industries as vehicles for interpreting his-
tory. His parting comment on the oil industry-after noting the
wastefulness of the "law of capture" and, among other anomalies
in the U.S. energy policy, the inconsistencies of government-
sanctioned import restrictions and toleration of maximum-
efficiency-rate pricing in the domestic oil fields on conservation
grounds 29-was to the effect that as a nation we had pursued a
mistaken public policy toward oil at every turn, and still we sur-
vived. Only our inherent economic strength saved us from such
heavy doses of public policy mismanagement. The enactment of the
numerous bills seeking horizontal divestiture within the oil and en-
ergy industries certainly may be in keeping with our historical pol-
icy record. This time, however, our inherent economic strength may
have dissipated to the point at which we are now unable to with-
stand further improvidences in our energy policy.
29. ESSAYS ON PETROLEUM CONSERVATION REGULATION (W.F. Lovejoy & J. Pikl eds. 1960);
Markham, Book Review, 35 CH. J. Bus. 318-19 (1962).
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